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Abstract 
 
The Eurozone crisis constitutes a grave challenge to European integration. This essay 
presents an overview of the causes of the crisis, and analyzes why has it been so 
difficult to resolve. It focuses on how responses to the crisis were shaped by 
distributive conflicts both among and within countries. On the international level, 
debtor and creditor countries have fought over the distribution of responsibility for 
the accumulated debt; countries with current account surpluses and deficits have 
fought over who should implement the policies necessary to reduce the current 
account imbalances. Within countries, interest groups have fought to shift the costs of 
crisis resolution away from themselves. The essay emphasizes that the Eurozone crisis 
shares many features of previous debt and balance-of-payments crises. However, the 
Eurozone’s predicament is unique because it is set within a monetary union that 
strongly constrains the policy options available to policymakers, and vastly increases 
the interdependence of the euro crisis countries on each other. The outcome of the 
crisis has been highly unusual, because the costs of resolving the crisis have been borne 
almost exclusively by the debtor countries and taxpayers in the Eurozone.  
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 1. Introduction 
 On January 1, 1999, eleven member states of the European Union (EU) 
triumphantly introduced a single currency, the euro. The Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) capped forty years of efforts to create a single market in which goods, 
capital, and people could move freely. With a common currency, that movement was 
powerfully facilitated. Ten years after its introduction, the leaders of the Eurozone – 
now increased to fifteen members, with four more waiting to enter – celebrated what 
appeared to be the successful launch of a new European currency. 
 But within a year of the proud celebration of the euro’s tenth anniversary, the 
Eurozone was thrown into crisis. And the Eurozone crisis has, over the subsequent 
years, turned into the gravest crisis in the history of European integration, only 
rivalled by Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the EU.  
 Why did this crisis emerge, and why has it been so difficult to resolve? After all, 
it took nine years for the Eurozone simply to return to pre-crisis levels of per capita 
output. This essay aims to answer these questions. It first analyzes the causes of the 
crisis, and then focuses on how the responses to the crisis were shaped by distributive 
conflicts at both the international and national levels. 
 The essay emphasizes three main points. First, the Eurozone crisis is just one in 
a long series of debt and balance-of-payments problems that the world has 
experienced in the past 200 years. As has been true of all of these crises, the eurozone 
crisis has led to stark political conflicts about its resolution, both between and within 
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states (e.g., Dyson 2014, Frieden 1991, Pepinsky 2009, Walter 2013). Debtor and creditor 
countries fight over the distribution of responsibility for the accumulated debt; 
countries with current account surpluses and deficits fight over who should 
implement the policies necessary to reduce the current account imbalances. Within 
countries, interest groups fight to shift the costs of crisis resolution away from 
themselves. The issue at stake, in the Eurozone as so often elsewhere, has been who 
would bear the burden of adjustment: who would make the sacrifices necessary to 
clean up the mess of accumulated, bad, debts (Frieden 2015b). These similarities of the 
Eurozone crisis with previous crisis allow us to analyze its political economy with tools 
that have been honed in Latin America, Asia, and other parts of the world (Copelovitch 
et al 2016).  
 Second, for all these similarities, the Eurozone’s predicament is unique. 
Not only is this a debt crisis among developed countries, which has not happened 
since Germany in the 1930s.1 This crisis has taken place in the unique setting of EMU, 
which involves a wide range of economic and political relations among members of a 
single market and a common currency. This strongly constrains the policy options 
available to policymakers, and vastly increases the interdependence of the euro crisis 
countries on each other. At the same time, the centrality of Europe’s monetary union 
to the development of the EU makes a lasting resolution of the Eurozone crisis crucial 
to prospects for the future of European integration more generally. Nonetheless, 
1 Industrial countries have resources at their disposal that developing countries do not: stronger 
financial systems, better social safety nets, more established creditworthiness. So the parallels between 
Spain and, say, Argentina are strong, but not perfect. 
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although there has been more institutional reform at the European level than one 
would have thought possible at the outset of the crisis, these reforms have done little 
to resolve the Eurozone’s root problems. 
Third, despite this high level of interdependence, the political conflicts about 
sharing the burden of adjustment in the Eurozone crisis have played themselves out 
in unusual ways. One set of countries, the creditor states, have been exceptionally 
successful in shifting most of that burden onto the debtor states. It is not surprising 
that the Eurozone debt crisis has led to huge bailout programs combined with strong 
conditionality that have forced the crisis countries to implement harsh austerity 
measures and pushed the crisis countries into deep recessions; this is a commonplace 
of debt crises. But it is striking – and extremely unusual – that the creditors have not 
granted the debtor countries (with the exception of Greece and Cyprus) any significant 
debt relief or debt restructuring and that the burden of crisis resolution has been 
pushed almost entirely onto the shoulders of taxpayers in both debtor and creditor 
states. Nevertheless, no country has left the Eurozone so far, and the crisis countries 
have implemented austerity packages on a scale unprecedented in Europe. As a result, 
the costs of resolving the crisis have been borne almost exclusively by the debtor 
countries and taxpayers in the Eurozone.  
 
2. Causes of the Euro Crisis 
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In its essence, the crisis in the Eurozone is a classic debt and balance-of-
payments crisis.2 Countries in the Eurozone borrowed heavily, largely to finance 
current consumption, as financial institutions in the rest of Europe were eager to lend. 
Large current account imbalances developed, as capital and goods flowed out of 
countries with current account surpluses into those countries with current account 
deficits. Borrowing fed economic expansion, which grew into a boom, then a bubble, 
largely in housing markets. When the bubble burst, lending dried up, and the heavily 
indebted countries found themselves unable to service their debts, unable to make up 
for the collapse of domestic demand by exporting, and unable to borrow additional 
funds in order to cover their continuing payments deficits. As with all debt and 
balance-of-payments crises, the result was economic distress and political conflict. In 
this section, we provide an overview of the origins of the crisis.3 
 
Macroeconomic divergence and capital flows with a single currency  
In the late 1990s, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was completed and the 
euro came into existence. By definition, the monetary authorities of a single currency 
area – including a nation-state – must adopt a single monetary policy. This can be 
economically and politically difficult when different regions, and different groups 
within regions, face different conditions  (Mundell 1961). At the time of the creation of 
2 The two are roughly identical: a country running a balance of payments deficit is accumulating debts. The 
payments balance measures flows; debts are a measure of stocks. 
3 Baldwin et al. (2015) provide a very useful compendium of the now generally accepted consensus among 
economists about the economic causes of the crisis. The discussion here parallels the consensus view presented 
there. 
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the Eurozone, there were major divergences among the macroeconomic circumstances 
of its constituent member states. These countries varied significantly with regard to 
growth and inflation, as well as  in their institutional configurations and growth 
models (Hall & Franzese 1998, Iversen et al 2016, Johnston et al 2014).  
The experiences of Germany and Spain are typical. Between 1998 and 2007, 
inflation in Germany averaged 1.5% a year, compared to 3.2% in Spain. Over the 
decade this led to a substantial divergence in prices. Moreover, German labor-market 
institutions led to wage restraint, which was not the case in Spain, so that wages 
diverged even more: in those ten years, unit labor costs in Germany fell by 3.9% while 
in Spain they rose by 30.4%.4  
The European Central Bank (ECB) had to devise one monetary policy despite 
this divergence in national economic conditions. Not surprisingly, it tended to choose 
an interest rate somewhere between what would have been ideal for slow-growing 
countries such as Finland, Germany, France, Benelux, and Austria and the fast-
growing periphery in Ireland and Southern Europe. This did little to combat slow 
growth in the core, where domestic investment opportunities were limited, and 
created strong incentives to invest abroad both in the Eurozone and outside it. At the 
same time, low or negative real interest rates in the periphery gave these countries 
substantial incentives to borrow.  
The difference in underlying conditions thus interacted with monetary policy 
to encourage capital flows. Almost immediately, financial institutions in slow-growing 
4 Data are from Frieden (2015a), chapter 4. 
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northern European countries searched for higher-yielding opportunities in the more 
rapidly growing periphery in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe and capital began 
flowing from the North to the periphery. Most of the loans ended up going into the 
periphery’s expanding housing market and the related construction industries. In 
Portugal, and especially in Greece, the government also took advantage of rock-
bottom interest rates to finance growing public deficits. 
The process was self-reinforcing:  the more capital flowed into Spain or Ireland, 
the faster they grew and the more asset prices there rose, the more attractive they 
looked to lenders, drawing in still more capital (for overviews, see for example Lane 
2012, Wihlborg et al 2010). Borrowers and lenders fed an upward spiral, with capital 
flows driving expansion and expansion encouraging further capital flows. The result 
was first a boom, then a bubble, primarily in housing but in asset markets more 
generally. At the same time, unit labor costs and real effective exchange rates rose 
significantly, eroding competitiveness especially vis-à-vis the core economies, where 
wage bargaining institutions allowed for wage moderation (Johnston et al 2014). As a 
result, large current account surpluses in the core and similarly large current account 
deficits in the periphery emerged (see figure 1). The Eurozone experience thus had all 
the features of a classic capital-flow cycle.  
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 Figure 1: Average Current Account Deficits in the Eurozone, 2003-09  
 
 
Bailout expectations 
These dynamics were further fueled by an expectation on the part of investors 
that in the event of a crisis in one of the debtors, the other member states would be 
forced to intervene. It was clear that contagion from a financial crisis in one country 
would be extremely rapid, and potentially extremely damaging, within a common 
currency area. The expectation was that EMU made each member state “too connected 
to fail,” as a result of which a country in financial distress would be bailed out. 
Governments understood that this bailout problem created moral hazard. The 
knowledge that the other states would be likely to bail out a country in financial 
problems could induce reckless behavior, which in turn might in fact make a bailout 
 9 
necessary. Faced with the prospect of this moral hazard, the founding governments of 
the Eurozone declared that there would be no bailout. 
However, the “no-bailout” declaration rang hollow. It was not enough simply 
to say that there would not be a bailout, for investors and other observers had long 
experience with governments being forced into bailouts against their will and better 
judgement. What could, and should, have been done, was to design an institutional 
structure to deal with financial difficulties in one member state – a highly conditional 
fund patterned on the IMF, a plan to wind up troubled banks, a mechanism to 
restructure debts. But some of the principal member states seemed to believe that any 
discussion of ways to deal with a financial crisis would only stimulate fears, and so 
the member states never considered a strategy more pragmatic and realistic than 
simply saying “No” over and over. 
The result was that the “no-bailout” commitment was not credible. Bailout 
expectations meant that even the least creditworthy member states were able to 
borrow at rates roughly equivalent to those charged to Germany (Chang & Leblond 
2015) . This was especially striking in the case of Greece, which joined the Eurozone in 
2001. No sensible observer regarded Greece as a credit risk equivalent to Germany; but 
the expectation was that if Greece got into trouble, Germany and other more 
creditworthy member states would bail it out. And, of course, the ability of the Greek 
government to borrow at unprecedentedly low interest rates gave the government 
major incentives to borrow far more than was prudent. 
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Inadequate policy responses 
European policymakers could have responded to the build-up of these 
imbalances by implementing appropriate fiscal policies. Germany and other northern 
European countries could have stimulated domestic economic growth, and absorbed 
more of their own savings, with an expansionary fiscal policy of tax cuts and spending 
increases. This would have reduced their current account surpluses, and kept more 
capital at home. Similarly, the peripheral European countries could have counteracted 
the slippery slope to a boom and bubble with more restrictive fiscal policies. Portugal 
and Greece were running government budget deficits, and they certainly could have 
dampened the irrational exuberance with tax increases and spending cuts. The 
Spanish and Irish government budgets were balanced, but the logic of counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy would have dictated that they accumulate surpluses – again, raising taxes 
and cutting spending – so as to restrain their overheated economies.  
However, there was little or no national interest in adopting the appropriate 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies – in fact, fiscal policies became more pro-cyclical after 
the euro was introduced (Bénétrix & Lane 2013). Germans appeared perfectly happy 
to see their financial institutions lend wildly to the European periphery, even while 
they maintained their traditional fiscal conservatism at home. Spaniards and others in 
the fast-growing periphery had no interest in reducing the pace of economic growth. 
 The principal argument for altering national fiscal policies was that it would 
help stabilize the Eurozone as a whole; but no nation’s politicians, or public, seemed 
concerned about the Eurozone as a whole, focusing instead on domestic matters. In 
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other words, for fiscal policies to have their full effect, member-state governments 
would have had to cooperate in designing and implementing them in the interests of 
a common purpose; and there was little or no political support for altering national 
policies in order to serve a vague Eurozone-wide common purpose. Attempts to 
coordinate fiscal policies at the EU-level through the Stability and Growth Pact also 
largely failed (Alt et al 2014, Baerg & Hallerberg 2016). As a result, fiscal policies 
remained uncoordinated, and indeed exacerbated the underlying macroeconomic 
imbalances (Lane 2012). 
It is interesting and important to note that this was not a solely Eurozone 
phenomenon. The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, also 
experienced large-scale capital inflows that led to rapid increases in the price of assets, 
especially housing, eventually leading to a housing bubble. In that sense, the process 
in the Eurozone was simply a microcosm of what was happening elsewhere. But EMU 
made a difference. One main difference was that the non-Eurozone countries that were 
undergoing this capital-flow cycle had full independence to design their own 
monetary policies, including the ability to devalue the exchange rate, an ability that 
proved particularly important when the bubble burst. Another was that they were less 
interconnected to each other, and a third was that their fiscal policies produced fewer 
externalities than in the Eurozone. 
These features reflected gaps in the original design and implementation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union.  They were widely understood at the time, and 
observers on both sides of the Atlantic warned that they would need to be addressed 
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(for an overview, see  Jonung & Drea 2010). It was well understood that the ECB would 
have trouble designing one monetary policy for such a disparate set of countries, and 
that the absence of fiscal policy coordination would cause problems. And the central 
issue of a prospective bailout, and of the lack of credibility of the no-bailout 
commitment, was also generally understood (e.g., Frieden 1998). 
But attempts to address these issues ran, over and over, into domestic and 
international political realities that militated against their resolution. No government 
was willing to alter its policies enough to deal with the systemic dangers that were 
building up in the Eurozone. And so as lending grew, the borrowing economies 
expanded, and asset and housing prices rose, neither national governments nor the 
institutions of the European Union and the Eurozone were able to address the stresses 
and strains that informed observers knew were building up. 
 
The bubble bursts: How a private debt crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis 
The global financial crisis that began late in 2007 brought the merry-go-round 
to an end. Peripheral European nations faced a “sudden stop.” The lending spigot was 
shut, and the borrowing nations were left with massive debts, a collapse in housing 
and other asset prices, and a terrible recession.  It was soon clear that the continent’s 
financial system was saddled with trillions of euros in debts that were very unlikely 
to be serviced as originally contracted, presenting a serious threat to the health of 
financial institutions that had been lending. Without direct intervention, European 
finance was likely to collapse. 
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The Eurozone crisis began in earnest when in late 2009, the Greek government 
disclosed that Greece had lied about its public deficit for years, and disclosed a budget 
deficit much larger than had previously been reported.5 Spreads on Greek bonds 
surged, and soon the Greek government found itself unable to service its debt. A few 
months later, a first, then a second bailout package was put together to help Greece 
weather the crisis. Financial markets, it turned out, had been right to doubt the “no-
bailout” commitment.  
Whereas the Greek crisis was a genuine sovereign debt crisis, it is important to 
understand that for most other Eurozone countries this crisis did not result from 
government borrowing (Blyth 2013). In fact, at its outset, the crisis was mainly one of 
private loans to private borrowers – a private debt crisis and not a state-to-state issue 
at all. But as the crisis evolved, this slowly changed and eventually evolved into a 
sovereign debt crisis. It came to implicate national governments at least in part due to 
the unwillingness or inability of debtor and creditor governments to force “their” 
private financial institutions to bear the full costs of their mistakes.  
Two things contributed to this evolution. The first was the general concern that 
problems in one nation’s private sector could affect general economic conditions in the 
country as a whole. This commonplace view gives governments reasons to be 
concerned about private financial difficulties, as a loss of confidence in the banking 
system can lead to a more generalized loss of confidence in the economy as a whole. 
5 For a precise trajectory of the crisis see, for example, Copelovitch et al. (2016). 
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Despite the private-to-private nature of the vast majority of the loans when the crisis 
hit, problems would inevitably affect general economic conditions and thus were of 
concern to national governments.  
A second development was crucial in turning a private debt problem into a 
major issue among governments. As debts went bad in the debtor nations, debtor-
country banks risked illiquidity and insolvency.  To prevent a financial meltdown, 
governments ended up assuming many of the bad debts of their banks – converting 
private into sovereign debts. But this led to growing public debt, which increased the 
country’s sovereign credit risk, which further weakened the financial system, and thus 
created a negative bank-sovereign loop (Acharya et al 2014). In Spain, for example, the 
government stepped in to nationalize or bail out its troubled banks, in the process 
borrowing heavily to finance the bailouts. Financial institutions in the creditor nations 
similarly faced collapse as their debts went unserviced, leading governments to devise 
means to support its financial sectors. Whether this socializing of losses was due to the 
fear that not intervening would have caused major economic disruptions; or to the 
desire to shore up economically and politically important private banks, it should be 
clear that both debtor and creditor governments chose to shunt the costs of the crisis 
almost entirely onto the backs of taxpayers.  
With peripheral governments now heavily in debt to creditor governments, and 
more broadly to other Eurozone member states and to Eurozone and EU institutions, 
the intra-European politics of the debt crisis became particularly troubled. As always, 
the core question was which countries would bear the principal costs of dealing with 
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the accumulated debts: how the adjustment burden would be distributed (Dyson 2014, 
Frieden 2015b). 
 
3. Crisis resolution: Options and Choices 
The main issue of contention in debt crises is how to deal with accumulated bad 
debts. One option is for debtor countries to repay the outstanding debt, mobilizing 
domestic resources by cutting spending or increasing taxes. Another option is for 
creditor countries to grant debt restructuring, providing some relief to debtor countries. 
This creates a conflict of interest: creditors want to be paid back in full, or as close to 
that as possible, while debtors want their debts to be restructured and reduced to the 
largest extent possible. Both sides have bargaining chips: creditors threaten to block 
future access to credit, debtors threaten to stop payment. This is why in most debt 
crises, creditors and debtors share the debt burden, although the precise terms vary. 
Debt are closely related to balance-of-payments crises. The resolution of debt 
crises concentrates on the stock of accumulated debts, whereas the resolution of BOP 
problems focuses on economic adjustments to address the flow problem of continuing 
current account imbalances that fuel the debt problems. BOP deficits imply that the 
country imports both more goods and capital than it exports, which means that current 
account deficits are associated with rising external debt levels. Not surprisingly, all the 
main Eurozone crisis countries ran sizeable current account deficits in the years before 
the crisis (see figure 1). Thus, to resolve a debt crisis, debtor countries not only have to 
resolve the problem of accumulated debts but typically also have to turn their current 
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account deficit into a surplus, to start exporting more goods and services than they 
import in order to earn the funds needed to repay the accumulated debts (the 
alternative is, of course, to default or restructure those debts). Likewise, creditor states 
can contribute to resolving these crises by boosting domestic demand to reduce their 
current account surplus. 
Policymakers have several policy choices at hand when it comes to resolving 
the flow problem of BOP imbalances (Broz et al 2016, Walter 2013). The necessary 
policy adjustment can occur in both surplus and deficit countries, in an externally or 
internally oriented way; and adjustment can be avoided altogether if the current 
account deficit is financed by external sources of money instead (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Options for resolving BOP imbalances 
 EXTERNAL 
ADJUSTMENT 
INTERNAL 
ADJUSTMENT 
FINANCING 
DEFICIT 
COUNTRY 
Exchange-rate 
devaluation 
 
Austerity and 
structural reforms 
Cover funding gap 
through external 
funding 
 
SURPLUS 
COUNTRY 
Exchange-rate 
appreciation 
Inflation and 
reforms aimed at 
boosting domestic 
demand 
Provide financing 
for deficit countries 
with BOP 
problems. 
 
IMPLICATION 
FOR THE 
EUROZONE 
Euro breakup Convergence of 
deficit and surplus 
countries 
 
Permanent 
financing 
structures (e.g., 
fiscal federalism, 
automatic 
stabilizers etc.) 
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The first option for rebalancing the current account, external adjustment, involves 
a change of the country’s exchange rate. This has been the standard response for deficit 
countries in the past. By devaluing its currency, domestic products become more 
competitive, which reduces imports and stimulates exports. A surplus country can 
revalue its currency, making domestic products more expensive relative to foreign 
products, thereby increasing imports and reducing exports.  
In contrast, internal adjustment, means that relative prices are adjusted through 
domestic macroeconomic policy changes and structural reforms. For deficit countries, 
this strategy is also known as “internal devaluation” and implies austerity policies 
such as public spending cuts and tax increases, and structural reforms that increase 
competitiveness. Because these measures aim at reducing domestic demand and a 
deflation of domestic prices, they are typically associated with increased 
unemployment, lower wages, asset price deflation, and recession. For surplus 
countries, internal adjustment implies policies that increase relative prices, for 
example through loose monetary or fiscal policy or reforms that stimulate domestic 
demand and increase inflation.  
Both internal and external adjustment can be painful and costly for 
policymakers. Devaluations often cost policymakers their jobs (Frankel 2005) and 
recessions reduce politicians’ reelection chances. Policymakers therefore frequently 
resort to a third option: financing the current account deficit with public funds. Initially, 
deficit countries often respond to BOP pressures by drawing on their foreign currency 
reserves. When these dry up, they need external support. Surplus countries, which 
 18 
tend to be the creditors of deficit countries, are often willing to grant such support, 
either bilaterally or through international organizations such as the IMF, because it not 
only reduces the risk that a deficit country defaults on its debt, but also allows surplus 
countries to forgo adjustment at home. But the financing strategy has one important 
downside: it does not resolve the underlying structural BOP imbalances, and often 
aggravates them, so that this approach carries the risk that eventual adjustment will 
have to be more extensive than if it had been implemented early on (Frankel & Wei 
2004). Debt and balance-of-payments crises thus confront policymakers with a list of 
unattractive options. Different socioeconomic groups, and, at the aggregate level, 
different societies differ in the extent to which they are vulnerable to each of these 
options. It should therefore come as no surprise that distributive concerns - both 
within countries and among countries – always influence the politics of resolving debt 
and balance-of-payments crises.  
What does this mean for the politics of the euro crisis? In principle, these policy 
options exist in the euro crisis as well. But because the debt and balance of payments 
crises occurred within a currency union crisis resolution has proven very difficult and 
the Eurozone’s policy response is unusual in a number of respects.  
In essence, Europeans have opted for a strategy that mainly relies on debt 
repayment by and internal adjustment in debtor states, coupled with temporary 
financing and expansionary monetary policy.6 Large bailout programs have been set 
6 For simplicity, we will mostly refer to debtor and creditor states in the discussion that follows. But it 
is important to keep in mind that debtor states start from a position as deficit state, whereas creditor 
states usually start from a position as surplus country. 
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up, but crisis countries have been forced to implement austerity and reforms in return, 
and no meaningful debt relief has been granted.  
On the one hand, this choice of crisis response – a combination of internal 
adjustment and financing rather than external adjustment and default – is not 
surprising. In the context of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, external 
adjustment implies a breakup of the Eurozone. Different variants of such a breakup are 
thinkable, ranging from the exit of a single country to the formation of two or more 
currency blocs or the introduction of parallel currencies. But whatever its form, 
external adjustment would mean that the euro would cease to exist in its current form, 
and this would carry huge costs for everyone involved. For this reason, this adjustment 
path has so far been ruled out by virtually all Eurozone policymakers. Removing 
external adjustment from its menu of options, the Eurozone is left with the alternatives 
of internal adjustment and financing.  
What is more surprising is the willingness of the debtor countries to accept the 
creditors’ refusal to grant debt relief and their insistence that they should shoulder the 
burden of internal adjustment almost entirely, which has resulted in deep recessions 
and record levels of unemployment in the debtor countries, while creditor countries 
have been much less affected by the crisis. The costs of the crisis have hence been very 
unequally distributed among the countries of the Eurozone. And inequality with 
regard to burden-sharing does not end at the international level: The costs of crisis 
resolution has also been very unequally distributed within countries, where some 
groups have been much harder hit than others.  
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It is therefore not surprising that there has been a great deal of conflict both 
among and within countries. Coming on top of the complex political structure of the 
EU, and the high level of uncertainty regarding the viability of different policy options, 
these conflicts have resulted in the Eurozone’s piecemeal approach to addressing the 
crisis, and help explain why many key issues still remain unresolved. 
 
4. Crisis resolution at the European level: conflict among countries 
Debt crises typically give rise to conflict between creditor and debtor countries, 
and the Eurozone crisis has been no exception. Creditors and debtors have squared off 
over how to address the enormous stock of accumulated debts; surplus and deficit 
countries have argued over who should be doing the adjusting. In the case of the 
Eurozone debts, inter-state conflict was complicated by the fact that private debts were 
quickly assumed by the governments of both debtor and creditor nations, and by 
European institutions more generally. Of course, this threw every interaction between 
debtor and creditor governments into the cauldron of intra-European politics, pitting 
national governments with divergent interests against one another. 
Indeed, from the moment the crisis began, debtor and creditor states have 
jockeyed for position in this difficult bargaining interaction (Schimmelfennig 2015), 
leveraging both bargaining power and (mostly self-serving) ideas in the process 
(Bulmer 2014, Dyson 2010). Although they agreed that external adjustment – some 
form of euro breakup – was not an option, they agreed on little else.  
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Conflicts about how to share the adjustment burden 
In these conflicts, both sides have weapons, which is why virtually all debt 
crises end with some form of compromise: creditors threaten to block future access to 
credit, debtors threaten to stop payment. Creditors typically hold most of the 
bargaining chips, for the threat of freezing errant debtors out of credit markets is very 
real, and very threatening. But debtors can and do threaten to default, which can cause 
damage to creditor financial markets. In the Eurozone crisis case, both sides have had 
additional weapons, given their common membership in both the EU and the 
Eurozone. Creditors could and did threaten errant debtor states with expulsion from 
the EU or the Eurozone, although the legal basis for this was unclear. Debtors, for their 
part, knew that if one member state defaulted there was likely to be a panic on bond 
markets that would affect all member states – including the creditors.  
This makes it all the more striking that the member states, and the institutions 
of the Eurozone, have  shied away from what is the most common sort of response to 
a debt crisis, debt restructuring. Although there has been some debt restructuring in 
the cases of Greece and Cyprus,7 there has been no debt relief or restructuring in Spain, 
Portugal, and Ireland. There have been financial rescue packages to help debtor 
governments meet their obligations in the midst of massive recessions, but there has 
been no meaningful debt relief. This is extraordinary, because virtually all debt crises 
eventually lead to some form of debt relief, just as corporate bankruptcies lead to a 
7 Greece’s debt was so enormous that it was clear almost from the start that it could never be serviced, 
so significant portions of that country’s debt have been restructured. In Cyprus, debt restructuring was 
part of the conditions attached to a bailout package from the Troika. 
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restructuring of the bankrupt company’s liabilities. As with corporate bankruptcies, it 
is widely recognized that debt relief can be beneficial to both debtors and creditors, 
inasmuch as it puts troubled debts on a sounder footing. Debt restructuring, indeed, 
is widely regarded as a very common Pareto improvement. To be sure, it is not 
uncommon for the principal adjustment burden to fall upon the debtor countries. But 
the absence of any real debt relief for the three principal Eurozone debtors thus makes 
this crisis extremely unusual – perhaps even unique – among sovereign debt crises.  
Pressure from creditor countries has also, as is often the case, taken the form of 
insistence that the debtors undertake substantial structural reforms in order to address 
chronic balance of payments problems (Copelovitch & Enderlein 2016, Hall 2012). But 
Spain and Ireland are not developing countries, and pressures from creditors have led 
these countries to predominantly rely on austerity rather than significant reforms of 
social policies or labor market institutions.8 The effect of this strategy on economic 
growth and employment prospects in these countries has been harsh. 
As a result, in the Eurozone crisis, the burden of adjustment has been put almost 
exclusively on the shoulders of the debtor countries. Figure 2 illustrates how unequally 
the costs of the adjustment have been spread across Eurozone countries. It shows how 
different Eurozone countries have fared throughout the crisis, tracing their economic 
development between 2007 to 2013 (noted by a triangle). It shows that the five main 
Eurozone debtor countries – Ireland, Italy, Portugal and especially Spain and Greece 
8 Indeed, it has also been difficult to credit insistence on structural reforms when so many of the creditor 
countries have been unable or unwilling to carry them out themselves. 
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– have witnessed massive increases in unemployment. GDP had fallen back to the 
levels of when the Eurozone was founded in three of these countries (the 1999 level is 
represented by the value of 100), and GDP decreased significantly in all five debtor 
states. In contrast, the economic cost of the crisis have been much smaller or even 
nonexistent in the creditor states.  
 
Figure 2: Crisis cost for selected Eurozone countries 
 
 
 
 
This image cannot currently be displayed.
 24 
Several reasons can be adduced for the fact that the principal burden of 
adjustment to the Eurozone crisis has fallen upon the debtors. The first is, as 
mentioned, the general fact that creditors have a very powerful weapon, the threat of 
financial exclusion. This threat is particularly serious for European countries, which 
are tightly integrated into European financial markets, and for which exclusion from 
those markets would be very damaging. A second consideration in the Eurozone case 
is that creditors have also invoked the requirements of broader EU and Eurozone 
membership, implying – sometimes stating – that something less than full repayment 
could result in expulsion from the Eurozone or the EU. Third, whether the threat of 
expulsion is real or not, certainly the extent of financial and commercial integration 
among EU members is so high that any loss of credibility on the part of the government 
and firms of one nation could be extremely costly. This last factor helps explain why 
many in the debtor countries have in fact been reluctant to press the issue, for fear that 
it might affect their own economic relations with the rest of the Eurozone. Fourth, the 
Eurozone creditors used their political influence over the International Monetary Fund 
to force the IMF to ignore the Fund’s own rules, which would have required 
substantial debt restructuring (IEO 2016). This eliminated the possibility that the 
involvement of the Fund – a repository of decades of experience in dealing with debt 
crises – would be objective and even-handed.9  Finally, emphasizing ordo-liberal ideas, 
9 The report of the IMF’s own Independent Evaluation Office (IEO 2016) makes this very clear. The role of 
political pressure from creditor countries is mentioned, for example, on page 42. 
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creditor countries have been successful in framing the crisis in ways that suggest that 
deficit countries caused, and hence should resolve, the crisis (Blyth 2013) . 
 
Conflicts about how to reform the Eurozone 
The crisis has also led to some attempts to rework the Eurozone itself. The member 
states have devised a series of Eurozone-wide mechanisms to attempt to address the 
fallout of the crisis, and avoid a recurrence. Every step of the way has been 
controversial (Howarth & Quaglia 2015). While there have been some modest efforts 
at greater fiscal policy coordination, these have been extremely limited and have had 
little impact. Instead, attempts to confront the crisis have centered on monetary policy, 
although the ECB implemented expansionary policies much later than its US and 
British counterparts. The member states also agreed to a banking union that centralizes 
and harmonizes a great deal of financial regulation under the auspices of the ECB 
(Howarth & Quaglia 2014).  
Perhaps the most important such institutional innovation is the development of 
a Eurozone bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, to make loans to troubled 
debtor governments.. The process began with the establishment of two temporary 
funds, the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism, which provided funds to troubled debtors (Gocaj & Meunier 
2013). In 2012 the member states agreed on a permanent European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), to lend to countries in distress. The ESM was capitalized at 80 
billion euro, with a total lending capacity of 700 billion euro. Access to ESM funds 
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depends on approval by the “Troika,” the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). And use of ESM funds 
binds the country in question to carry out macroeconomic and other economic policies 
designed to address enduring payments imbalances. While the ESM is relatively new, 
it is clear that its operation will raise many of the political issues present in debtor-
creditor relations more generally. In a sense, the ESM is like a Eurozone IMF, with all 
that implies. Member states all want such a mechanism; but they disagree 
fundamentally on what it should require of governments that have recourse to its 
funds. 
There have been continuing conflicts over other proposals, both to address the 
crisis and to try to prevent future crises. One discussion has centered on financing, 
which could provide a route out of this impasse. If financing were provided in a 
permanent fashion, adjustment would be needed on a much lesser scale. Permanent 
financing implies some form of a transfer (or fiscal) union, be it in the form of 
Eurozone-wide welfare policies, Eurobonds, or direct transfers. One very popular 
suggestion, but forth by a number of economists and eventually supported by the 
European Commission, was for Eurozone member states to jointly issue bonds backed 
by all (see for example De Grauwe & Moesen 2009). This would have shared both the 
risk, and the benefits, of pooling sovereign borrowing. While it clearly benefits the less 
creditworthy countries more than the rest, there is some reason to believe that it would 
have enhanced sovereign debt markets more generally, adding to their depth and 
liquidity. In the event, the idea was opposed by the German government, and has not 
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been pursued. More generally, financing proposals have faced the problem that they 
are unpopular in both surplus states – because they would likely foot the bill – and 
deficit countries – because this would likely reduce their national sovereignty in 
economic policymaking. More importantly, such permanent financing schemes would 
require more political integration than is currently feasible. 
It is important to recognize that the principal cause of the failure to address the 
crisis is to be found in the actions of the member states. Certainly the European 
institutions have not helped much, with the exception of the ECB. But the real obstacle 
to a constructive resolution of the crisis is that the national governments simply have 
not been able to agree on how to move forward. The governments of creditor nations 
have continued to insist that the debtors must shoulder the adjustment burden, 
contending that only austerity can bring them out of their deep depressions. The 
governments of debtor nations have persistently maintained that only some form of 
debt relief will make the burden bearable. Meaningful negotiations to address the core 
problem, the weight of accumulated debts, have been deadlocked for years, with little 
sign of forward movement. And it is primarily the member states that are responsible 
for this deadlock. 
The failure of the member states, and of other EU or Eurozone institutions ,to 
address the debt crisis has left the ECB as the principal – practically sole – Eurozone 
economic institution capable of attempting to address the crisis. The ECB has in fact 
taken quite aggressive measures, including a substantial bond-buying program to 
shore up financial markets, and a monetary policy that has pushed interest rates into 
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negative territory. The ECB’s policies have had some positive impact, especially on 
confidence in the euro, but the ECB alone was not enough to counteract the massive 
recessionary impact of the debt overhang.  
As might be expected, ECB policy has also been controversial. For many in 
northern Europe, the central bank’s low (even negative) interest rate policy is 
anathema, limiting the returns to their savers. For many in peripheral Europe, the 
central bank has not done enough to alleviate the impact of the crisis. Overall, the ECB 
has become embroiled in political disputes, something its architects explicitly tried to 
avoid. 
One of the more serious effects of the Eurozone debt crisis, and of the 
inadequacies of the policy response to the crisis, has been the wedge it has driven 
among Eurozone member states. Rather than build cohesion among the members of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, the crisis has driven countries into warring camps, 
each side blaming the other for the crisis and for the extraordinarily slow recovery. 
Governments in the Eurozone remain at loggerheads over how the address the 
aftermath of the crisis, and how to move forward once it is past (Dyson 2014). 
 Overall, neither the institutions of the European Union, nor the constituent 
member states, have effectively addressed the crisis (Jones et al 2015). There has been 
no effective coordinated fiscal response, no debt restructuring for any country but 
Greece and Cyprus, and little substantial reform to national or Eurozone institutions. 
After years of ongoing problems, the root causes of the crisis are still not resolved 
 
 29 
5. Domestic crisis resolution: Politics within countries 
The euro crisis has also been characterized by strong distributive conflict within 
countries about how the costs of crisis resolution should be shared. Such conflicts have 
taken place in both debtor (deficit) and creditor (surplus) states.  
These conflicts have not been fought as conflicts about the appropriate 
adjustment strategy, but mainly as conflicts about how to implement an internal 
adjustment strategy (in deficit countries) and how to provide financing and avoid 
internal adjustment (in surplus countries). This is because external adjustment – that 
is leaving the euro, forcing one country to leave the euro, or splitting up the Eurozone 
– has rarely been regarded as a viable option. Support for the euro has remained 
remarkably high in all Eurozone countries throughout the crisis (Hobolt & Wratil 2015, 
Roth et al 2015). Although in deficit states most people express a preference for the 
rather impossible crisis strategy of keeping the euro and ending austerity at the same 
time (Clements et al 2014, Fernández-Albertos & Kuo 2016), they have shown a strong 
preference for the euro when pressed to choose between the two (Dinas et al 2016).  
So far, only populist parties have called for their country to leave the Eurozone 
or a dissolution of the Eurozone altogether (Heinen et al 2015): among the creditor 
states, the Dutch PVV, the German AfD, the French Front National, and the Austrian 
FPÖ have called for a controlled dissolution of the Eurozone, with the True Finns in 
Finland taking a critical but more cautious position. Among the deficit countries, there 
has been a strong push for a referendum on the euro in Italy, supported by Beppe 
Grillo’s Five Star Movement, the Lega Nord, and Forza Italia  and in Greece the 
 30 
communist KKE and the SYRIZA-spinoff Popular Unity have proposed leaving the 
euro. But in addition to virtually all other parties, there are also a two important 
populist parties who do not support leaving the Eurozone: Podemos (Spain) and 
SYRIZA (Greece). 
Thus, with the external adjustment option off the table – at least for the time 
being – national political conflicts have centered on how to manage the crisis within 
the preferred strategy of internal adjustment in deficit states coupled with some 
financing from surplus states.  
 
Crisis politics in debtor states 
Conflict has been most intense in debtor states, which were hit hardest by the 
crisis. As countries who have ruled out an exit from the Eurozone, they have been 
tasked to implement internal adjustment: spending cuts, demand compression, 
structural reforms. As in many other crises, this setting has created political 
difficulties, distributive conflicts, and turmoil around the question of how the 
resources necessary to service debts should be mobilized and which policy reforms 
should be implemented to rebalance the current account. Given that surplus countries 
have been unwilling to share the burden of adjustment, politics in deficit countries has 
centered on who will bear the brunt of the costs of the crisis: consumers, taxpayers, 
investors, government employees, pensioners, the unemployed, the export sector, the 
nontradable sector and so on.  
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Although the fallout from the crisis in deficit states has been huge, its impact 
has varied significantly among social groups. For example, even though overall 
unemployment and poverty rates have significantly increased across the board, the 
young have been hit hardest. Youth unemployment tripled in Ireland between 2007 
and 2012, and between 2012 and 2014 more than half of economically active people 
under 25  in Greece and Spain were without work.10 More generally, unemployment 
has hit the young, men and less educated people hardest (Gutiérrez 2014). Likewise, 
relative poverty rates for young people went up in Italy, Portugal and especially Spain 
and Greece. At the same time, relative poverty rates for the elderly declined 
considerably. Interestingly, inequality has only increased in some countries (most 
notably, Greece), whereas crisis policies seem to have had no or an inequality-
decreasing impact in other countries (Matsaganis & Leventi 2014). Both crisis-related 
policies and the overall impact of the economic crisis in deficit states have thus differed 
in how they have affected different socioeconomic groups (Avram et al 2013). 
More generally, austerity – spending cuts and tax increases – has been the 
preferred policy choice, whereas structural reforms have been implemented more 
hesitantly. Given that the latter were often aimed at stripping privileges from 
politically influential groups, they often have been implemented only under 
considerable external pressure, and even then compliance has been spotty. Similarly, 
banks and other financial market participants have largely been able to socialize their 
losses, rolling them over to taxpayers (Blyth 2013). As discussed above, debtor-country 
10 Eurostat (2016): http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database 
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governments ended up assuming many of the bad debts of their banks – which 
converted private into sovereign debts. Entrenched insider-outsider structures 
(Bentolila et al 2012), strong resistance by vested interests (Featherstone 2015) and 
clientelistic politics (Afonso et al 2015) have thus generally protected politically 
influential groups. Overall, this mirrors earlier crises where governments have 
shielded their own voter base from the crisis consequences as much as possible (Walter 
2016). 
These conflicts about how to manage the crisis have reshaped party systems in 
some crisis countries and paralyzed politics in others. Although some of the discontent 
has played out in the streets (Accornero & Ramos Pinto 2015, Genovese et al 2016, 
Giugni & Grasso 2016, Peterson et al 2015), the electoral consequences of the crisis have 
been more profound, affecting party systems in Ireland (Marsh & Mikhaylov 2012), 
Portugal (Goulart & Veiga 2016, Magalhães 2012), Italy (Bellucci 2014), Spain (Martín 
& Urquizu-Sancho 2012, Medina & Correa 2016), and Greece (Dinas & Rori 2013, Rori 
2016). In Greece, Italy, and Spain, influential populist and anti-establishment parties 
have emerged or been strengthened in the wake of the crisis: SYRIZA in Greece, the 
Five Stars movement and Lega Nord in Italy, and Podemos and Ciudadanos in Spain. 
Overall, incumbents and mainstream parties have been punished in elections across 
the board and the crisis has had a destabilizing effect on these countries’ party systems 
(Bellucci et al 2012, Bosco & Verney 2016, Hernández & Kriesi 2015, Katsanidou & 
Otjes 2016).  
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Crisis Politics in Creditor states 
But creditor states have also been internally conflicted about how to resolve the 
euro crisis. These countries have grappled with the question of who should bear the 
main burden. Should financial institutions be made to absorb the losses from the loans 
they made? Or should taxpayers step in either to shore up the domestic financial 
systems, or to provide funding to help the debtor countries service their debts? Should 
surplus countries engage in macroeconomic adjustment to boost domestic 
consumption and hence lower the adjustment burden on deficit states?  
One of the most important distributive questions that faced creditor states early 
on was whether they should let their financial system absorb the costs of the crisis by 
defaults or debt restructuring in the debtor states, or whether they should transfer the 
costs of the crisis onto taxpayers by providing public funds to the debtor countries that 
would allow them to service their debts.  
When the question of whether to bail out Greece first arose in 2010, it was clear 
that the alternative – a Greek default – might trigger similar defaults in other debtor 
countries, which in turn would seriously threaten the stability of banks in the creditor 
states still weakened from the global financial storm of 2007-09. Not only could this 
have triggered a Eurozone-wide financial crisis and seriously damaged the single 
currency project, bank bailouts were also deeply unpopular among publics in creditor 
countries (Goerres & Walter 2016), and hence politically costly. This made it easier to 
support domestic banks indirectly via a bailout of a Eurozone debtor state (Ardagna 
& Caselli 2014). Figure 3 shows that this question has been decidedly resolved in favor 
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of the banks, which have been able to reduce significantly their exposure to crisis 
countries over the 2009-2013 period.11 As a result, most of the risks associated with this 
debt have been passed on to taxpayers in a variety of forms, such as bailout guarantees 
or growing Target2 balances in creditor states’ central banks.  
  
11 The reduction is even more pronounced when looking at exposure to claims on Greece only. 
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 Figure 3: Bank claims by selected Eurozone countries on euro crisis countries 
 
 
 
In short, creditor countries preferred to finance debtor countries temporarily 
with taxpayer money, while pushing the internal adjustment burden on these 
countries through strict conditionality and sheltering their own financial institutions 
from the costs of debt restructuring.  
Given the exposure of creditors’ national banking systems to bad debts in the 
Eurozone periphery, it is perhaps not surprising that governments were intent on 
steering the debate away from the issue. They have been successful in framing the 
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crisis as a “sovereign debt crisis” of overspending in deficit countries, to which 
“austerity” in these states is the logical conclusion (Blyth 2013). 
Much existing research on crisis politics in creditor states focuses on Germany, 
where the dominant narrative of the crisis has been one of “Northern Saints and 
Southern Sinners“ (Matthijs & McNamara 2015) not just in the media, but also in 
the national and international political discourse. For example, in German 
parliamentary debates over a number of crisis measures, only one party, the populist 
left “Die Linke,” repeatedly deplored the fact that that the bailouts were large 
redistributive programs from German and peripheral taxpayers to German and other 
creditor states’ banks (Wonka 2016). No other party discussed this issue, framing the 
debate on crisis management in terms of “solidarity,” and “European integration” 
instead (Degner & Leuffen 2016, Wendler 2014). These more ideological frames seem 
to have resonated with the German public (Bechtel et al 2014) and even firms (Jäger 
2013).  
Yet many questions about creditor state politics remain unanswered. Why have 
left parliamentarians and trade unions in creditor states not framed the debate in terms 
of internal adjustment, which would justify measures stimulating domestic demand, 
such as increasing the minimum wage or public spending? Why have interest groups 
become less visible during the crisis, and why has there been a near consensus on the 
crisis narrative among policymakers in Germany and Austria (Leupold 2016)? Overall, 
research on the domestic distributive politics of the euro crisis in creditor states is 
much less developed than for debtor states. Existing research mostly focuses on the 
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political struggles about concrete policies, rather than the underlying strategic decision 
to pursue a path of giving preference to a publicly-funded financing strategy rather 
than pursuing domestic macroeconomic and structural adjustment. This is surprising, 
given the dominant role that creditor states have played in shaping the eurozone’s 
answer to the crisis. Analyzing the distributive effects of the euro crisis, their interplay 
with ideas and narratives, and their effect on crisis politics in creditor states thus is a 
promising avenue for future research. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The Eurozone crisis has dragged on for eight years, and shows no signs of 
ending. This is a damning indictment of the European Union’s member states, and of 
its constituent institutions. After all, one of the principal justifications for the creation 
of an Economic and Monetary Union was that the member states together would be 
able to solve problems that they could not adequately address separately. Instead, 
amidst the most serious economic crisis in 75 years, the member states have spent 
nearly a decade in bitter bickering that has, if anything, exacerbated the effects of the 
initial financial distress. Not surprisingly, among the European public trust in EU 
institutions (Roth et al 2014) and democracy (Armingeon & Guthmann 2014, Cramme 
& Hobolt 2014) has fallen significantly over the course of the crisis , and euroskepticism 
is on the rise (Hobolt & de Vries 2016), with Brexit only the latest and most visible 
challenge to the EU. 
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 The sources of the crisis are to be found in the political economy of European 
monetary integration, and in particular in the construction of a common currency 
without having resolved underlying conflicts over how it would be managed. These 
conflicts implicate powerful national interests, and equally powerful particularistic 
special interests. The pulling and hauling of member states with conflicting interests, 
and of powerful groups with enormous amounts of money at stake, has driven the 
European Union into the most serious crisis in its history. It will only emerge from the 
crisis once it manages to reconcile the various national and group interests in conflict 
in a manner acceptable to at least the bulk of the Union’s member states and citizens. 
So far, it has shown little ability to find its way toward such a resolution. 
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